On Monday, December 23, 2024, David L. Ruetz filed a request with the Ohio Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition against Judge John T. Stelzer, who presides over the Court of Common Pleas in Williams County, Ohio. Ruetz, currently incarcerated at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in his case concerning charges related to the possession of dangerous ordnance and inducing panic.
The action filed by Ruetz stems from an incident dated November 17, 2020, when he was taken into custody for allegedly brandishing a sawed-off shotgun while making threatening remarks in a public area. Following his arrest, he faced charges under Ohio Revised Code (O.R.C.) 2923.17(A) for possession of dangerous ordnance and O.R.C. 2917.31(A)(3) for inducing panic, both classified as fifth-degree felonies. The charges included a firearm specification, which could enhance the severity of the penalties if convicted.
During the initial court proceedings, Ruetz reportedly challenged the classification of his weapon, stating that it was a black powder muzzleloader and not a firearm as defined under Ohio law. He argued that this classification exempted him from the charges of dangerous ordnance. His defense maintained that due to its nature, the weapon did not meet legal definitions for firearms or dangerous ordnance.
The trial court proceeded with the case based on the state’s assertion that the sawed-off shotgun in question qualified as dangerous ordnance. The prosecution relied on O.R.C. 2923.11(K), which defines dangerous ordnance to include sawed-off firearms. However, Ruetz’s legal representation contended that the muzzleloader was an antique weapon and therefore exempt from the definition of dangerous ordnance as outlined in O.R.C. 2923.11(L).
In the subsequent appeal, Ruetz’s counsel argued that the trial court misapplied the law by failing to recognize the exception that could apply to his muzzleloader. The Sixth District Court of Appeals acknowledged the complexities surrounding the definitions of dangerous ordnance and firearms in Ohio law but ultimately upheld the trial court’s findings.
In his petition to the Ohio Supreme Court, Ruetz asserts that the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction by proceeding with the dangerous ordnance charge. He argues that the court’s denial of his argument regarding the classification of his weapon illustrates a lack of jurisdiction over the matter. Ruetz cites the case of In re Lockhart (1952) to support his claim that a writ of prohibition should be issued to prevent further proceedings.
Ruetz’s legal team emphasizes that the trial court’s actions constituted a usurpation of its jurisdiction, contending that the court failed to properly assess whether it had the constitutional authority to adjudicate the charges brought against him. They argue that subject matter jurisdiction is essential for the court to proceed in any criminal case, and if it is lacking, any resulting judgments may be deemed invalid.
A copy of the original filing can be found here.
