The New York Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics has issued an opinion clarifying the circumstances under which a judge may preside over cases involving their former law firm after a mandatory disqualification period. Opinion 25-104 addresses the reassignment of cases to judges who were previously required to recuse themselves due to prior employment at a private law firm.

The opinion distinguishes between cases where the sole reason for disqualification was the judge’s prior affiliation with the law firm and cases where the judge had direct involvement as an attorney. According to the committee, if the only basis for a judge’s initial disqualification was the case’s original filing or assignment during the two-year period following the judge’s departure from their former firm, the judge is permitted to accept reassignment of the case once the two-year period has elapsed. In such instances, the judge is not obligated to disclose the prior disqualification or offer to recuse themselves again, provided they believe they can be fair and impartial.

However, the committee emphasizes that a judge is permanently disqualified from any case in which they participated as an attorney, regardless of how minimal their involvement may have been. This permanent disqualification cannot be waived or remitted.

The opinion references several rules and prior opinions to support its conclusions. It cites Judiciary Law § 14, which addresses judicial disqualification, and various provisions of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct (22 NYCRR Part 100), including those pertaining to maintaining the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (100.2 and 100.2[A]), disqualification when impartiality might reasonably be questioned (100.3[E][1]), and disqualification based on prior legal service (100.3[E][1][b][i]-[ii]).

The Committee also referenced the importance of avoiding the appearance of impropriety and promoting public confidence in the judiciary. The opinion underscores that judges must disqualify themselves in situations where their impartiality could be reasonably questioned, as mandated by the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.

The opinion clarifies the calculation of the two-year disqualification period, stating that it begins only after all business and financial ties between the judge and their former firm have been completely severed. Throughout this period, the judge is prohibited from presiding over matters involving the firm or its clients unless the disqualification is properly remitted.

The Committee referenced previous opinions (Opinions 18-46; 17-100; 15-63) where it stated that once the two-year period elapses, and absent any other basis for disqualification, it is within the judge’s discretion whether to recuse in matters involving the former law firm or its clients.

The opinion also cites the Court of Appeals decision in People v. Moreno, which affirms that a judge is the sole arbiter of recusal.