On Tuesday, December 10, 2024, FTC law clerk Pranita Balusu published an opinion piece on Fix The Court‘s website, arguing against the notion that the Supreme Court is exempt from ethical regulations. The piece responds to a recent article by North Dakota Law Professor Michael McGinniss, who contends that Congress lacks the authority to impose ethical standards on the Supreme Court.
Balusu’s article challenges McGinniss’s assertion of the Court’s “exceptionalism,” which he claims justifies a recent, unenforceable Code of Conduct. McGinniss argues that the Supreme Court’s unique role in adjudicating cases with significant national implications necessitates a preservation of its judicial independence. He cites Article III, Section One of the Constitution, which establishes the Supreme Court’s existence independently of Congressional action.
While acknowledging that Congress cannot abolish the Supreme Court, Balusu emphasizes that the administration and operational oversight of the Court fall within Congress’s jurisdiction. She questions the implications of McGinniss’s argument, pointing out that the Constitution grants Congress significant powers regarding impeachment and appellate jurisdiction. Balusu argues that this does not preclude Congress from overseeing other aspects of the Court’s function, such as the number of justices and the appropriation of its budget.
The opinion piece references historical legislation aimed at judicial ethics, suggesting that other aspects of Court administration have been subject to Congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper clause. Balusu argues that ethics should not be treated differently from other operational matters.
McGinniss posits that judicial ethics should be managed solely by the judicial branch to maintain independence. He defines judicial independence as both decisional independence—judges’ ability to make decisions without political influence—and institutional independence— the judicial branch’s structural autonomy as a coequal government branch. Balusu counterargues that the debate is framed incorrectly as a choice between preserving institutional independence and implementing external regulatory measures that could enhance public trust in the Court.
Balusu questions whether an enforceable ethics code would indeed compromise the Court’s self-governance. She argues that it would not, particularly if ethics violations were addressed by a committee of senior judges instead of Congress. According to her, such a framework could bolster the Court’s independence and shield justices from ideological scrutiny, a concern highlighted by McGinniss.
The piece also notes that despite the current lack of enforceable ethics, justices are not insulated from political pressures. Balusu references increasing scrutiny from Congress, the media, and the public, which has contributed to a decline in trust towards the Court. She suggests that enforceable ethics could serve as a useful mechanism for justices to defend themselves against these pressures.
Balusu highlights the dismissal rates of complaints against lower court judges, noting that 98-99 percent are ultimately not upheld. She argues that a similar process for the Supreme Court, facilitated by a judicial council, could enhance justices’ reputations and mitigate ideologically driven attacks regarding ethical conduct.
In conclusion, Balusu asserts that the argument against Congressional involvement in enforcing Court ethics lacks support. She emphasizes that while maintaining judicial independence is crucial, it should not come at the expense of necessary checks and balances. She argues that given the significant consequences of Supreme Court decisions, implementing ethical guidelines is essential for sound decision-making.
Source: Fix The Court
