On Friday, April 17, 2026, the Metropolitan News-Enterprise reported that Div. Two of the Fourth District Court of Appeal vacated an order that had denied a request to disqualify a judge from a special-circumstances murder case.

The judge, Samah Shouka, had previously worked in the Homicide Unit of the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office. The defendant in the case claimed statistical evidence indicated the prosecutorial office disproportionately pursued the death penalty for Black suspects.

Acting Presiding Justice Douglas P. Miller, along with Justices Carol D. Codrington and Frank J. Menetrez, acknowledged that their conclusion does not automatically require the recusal of every former prosecutor-turned-judge in cases involving claims of racial discrimination under the Racial Justice Act (RJA). The RJA is codified at Penal Code §745.

The court pointed out that Judge Shouka had made recommendations on filing charges in homicide cases during the period relevant to the RJA motion. She also attended staffing meetings where decisions were made on charges in other cases. The court declared that someone aware of these facts might reasonably doubt Judge Shouka’s impartiality in determining if the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office had a pattern of bias in filing homicide charges, given her personal involvement in these decisions.

The case originated with the 2018 murder of Erica Johnson, who was pregnant. Russell Austin was arrested and charged with first-degree murder with special circumstances. Prosecutors sought the death penalty. Austin filed a claim under §745(a)(3), arguing he was charged with a more serious offense than defendants of other races who engaged in similar conduct. He supported his claim with statistical data from 2006 to 2019, alleging bias against Black defendants.

Ironically, it was the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office, not the defendant, that sought to disqualify Shouka under Code of Civil Procedure §170.1(a). Prosecutors argued Shouka met conditions for disqualification because a person aware of the facts might reasonably doubt her impartiality, she had personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, and she had served as a lawyer or given advice to a party in the present proceeding.

Judge Jeffrey B. Jones of the Imperial Superior Court was assigned to the disqualification request. Shouka opposed the request, acknowledging her work in the homicide unit from 2015-18 but stating none of her cases were among those cited by the defendant as comparable case studies and that her recusal would not serve justice. Jones ruled against the prosecutors, stating that none of the contentions in the amended statement of disqualification appeared logically related to Judge Shouka’s impartiality. The prosecutors then filed a petition for a writ of mandate, seeking to overturn Jones’ order.

Justice Miller noted the limited case law on whether a former district attorney employee can serve as a judge in a case involving an RJA motion. He cited an advisory opinion from the California Supreme Court Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinions, which suggested disqualification is required if a reasonable person could justifiably doubt the judge’s ability to remain impartial due to prior prosecutorial involvement.

Miller highlighted Shouka’s involvement in filing decisions on murder cases and collaborative discussions involving charges, legal theories, and strategies.

The court directed the superior court to vacate its order denying the People’s amended statement of disqualification against Judge Shouka and enter a new order granting it.

 

 

Source: Metropolitan News-Enterprise