On Tuesday, April 7, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued an order regarding a legal action initiated by James Quinn against Judge Douglas Rastatter of the Clark County Court of Common Pleas. Quinn sought a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Rastatter to rule on several pending motions in Quinn’s criminal case.
Quinn was convicted of multiple crimes in Clark County in 2014 and sentenced to 20 years in prison. In April 2024, Quinn filed a petition for postconviction relief and a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial. By July 2025, with no ruling from Judge Rastatter on either the petition or the motions, Quinn filed an action in mandamus seeking to compel the judge to act.
The Supreme Court’s ruling addresses Quinn’s petition for postconviction relief and his motions related to a new trial. The court noted that Judge Rastatter had since denied Quinn’s petition for postconviction relief. Consequently, the Supreme Court denied as moot Quinn’s request for a writ of mandamus concerning the postconviction relief petition. The court also granted Quinn’s motion for judicial notice.
However, Quinn’s motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial and the motion for a new trial remained pending before Judge Rastatter. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus directing Judge Rastatter to rule on Quinn’s motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial. The court denied the writ regarding the motion for a new trial, emphasizing that the motions must be addressed sequentially.
The court explained that under the Ohio Criminal Rules, these motions must be ruled on sequentially. Because Quinn was convicted more than 120 days prior, he must first seek leave to file a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. If Judge Rastatter finds clear and convincing proof that Quinn was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence and grants the motion for leave, Quinn then has seven days to file the motion for a new trial.
The Supreme Court noted that Quinn’s motion for leave had been pending for two years. While the Rules of Superintendence provide guidance that motions should be resolved within 120 days, this rule does not create an enforceable right in mandamus or procedendo. However, the court found that Judge Rastatter had unduly delayed ruling on Quinn’s motion for leave and granted the writ of mandamus to compel a ruling.
The court clarified that it was only ordering Judge Rastatter to rule on the motion for leave and was not directing him on how to rule.
A copy of the original filing can be found here.
