On Wednesday, April 22, 2026, Fulton County Superior Court Judge Shermela J. Williams asked the Supreme Court of Georgia to dismiss disciplinary proceedings against her, arguing that her resignation divests the court of its jurisdiction. Williams submitted her resignation on February 20, 2026, which the Governor accepted immediately.
The case involves two separate Supreme Court dockets, S24Z1139 and S25Z0722, and multiple JQC (Judicial Qualifications Commission) complaint numbers spanning from 2022 to 2024.
Williams contends that with her resignation, she no longer holds judicial office, thus eliminating the constitutional basis for disciplinary action. The argument rests on the interpretation of the Georgia Constitution, which grants the Court authority to discipline a judge who may be “removed, suspended, or otherwise disciplined.” Williams asserts that this authority is expressly tied to an individual’s status as a judge.
The filing argues that the JQC’s attempt to seek a permanent ban from office is an “extraordinary, wholly unfounded request that is against practice, precedent, and the Georgia Constitution.” The document references a prior case, Inquiry Concerning Judge Johnson, where the Court dismissed disciplinary proceedings after the judge resigned. It is argued that the Johnson case set a precedent that should be followed in Williams’s case.
The document questions whether a permanent prohibition on holding future judicial office is permissible under the Georgia Constitution and whether the matter is moot following Williams’s resignation. It emphasizes that the JQC sought only Williams’s removal from judicial office, not a ban on holding future office.
The filing also cites Georgia law O.C.G.A. § 15-1-13, which imposes a 7-year ban before a removed judge may seek judicial office again. It argues that the constitutional phrase “otherwise disciplined” should not be construed to encompass a lifetime ban, as the General Assembly has already set a finite limit.
The document further argues that neither the Georgia Constitution nor any statutory provision authorizes a permanent prohibition from running for judicial office as a viable sanction. It cites Justice Blackwell’s concurrence in Inquiry Concerning Judge Crawford, cautioning against interpreting the Court’s disciplinary authority in a manner untethered from constitutional and statutory limits.
A copy of the original filing can be found here.
